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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
This case proceeded to a Jury Trial on April 3, 2013; at which time Ms. Hopkins was 
convicted of Malicious Injury to Property a violation of Idaho Code § 18-7001. Ms. Hopkins 
filed her Notice of Appeal on June 13, 2013. The District Court heard argument and took the 
matter under advisement. The District Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order 
affirming the conviction on January 14, 2014, and Ms. Hopkins now timely appeals. On appeal, 
Ms. Hopkins asserts (1) that the trial court committed error when it failed to properly instruct the 
jury on the defense of misfortune or accident; and (2) that there was insufficient evidence to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Hopkins had the requisite intent to maliciously injure 
or destroy the property of another. 
Statement of the Facts 
Kelsey Hopkins is a recently married 21 year-old who lives in Garden City. (4/3/13 Tr. 
142, Ls.11-12). Kelsey has a very strong relationship with her brother because they were 
abandoned by their mother at a very young age and their father died of cancer during their 
formative years. (4/3/13 Tr. 142, Ls.15 - p. 143 Ls.16). They were basically homeless and 
Kelsey was responsible for her brother. (4/3/13 Tr. 143, Ls.15-19). 
On the date in question, Kelsey was at her brother's court hearing for a juvenile issue. 
(4/3/13 Tr. 143, L.25). After the sentence, her brother was taken into custody and she quickly 
and angrily left the courtroom. (4/3/13 Tr. 144, Ls.8-16). Kelsey was trying to hurry and leave 
the courtroom and get to the car because she was about to cry and she does not like to cry in 
front of other people. (4/3/13 Tr. 144, Ls.8-16). Kelsey cares a lot about her brother and 
anything that happens to him hurts her deeply. (4/3/13 Tr. 145, Ls.13-16). 
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After Kelsey opened the door, a loud knocking sound occurred and a hole in the wall was 
discovered. ( 4/3/13 Tr. 98, Ls.11-24). An officer went to see Kelsey later in the day and at that 
time Kelsey was unaware that there even was a hole in the wall where the door had hit it. 
(4/3/13 Tr. 147, Ls.1-11). Kelsey did not see the hole nor hear the door hit the wall causing the 
hole. ( 4/3/13 Tr. 148, Ls.2-6). She was very upset and was almost running to just try and get to 
her car. (4/3/13 Tr. 148, Ls.7-10). Once Kelsey was made aware of the damage she apologized 
and told the officer that she would return to the Courthouse on Monday to talk to them about 
what she could do. ( 4/3/13 Tr. 148, Ls.14-18). Kelsey even offered to write a letter to the judge. 
(4/3/13 Tr. 148, Ls.14-18). Kelsey specifically told the officer that she did not intend to put a 
hole in the wall. (4/3/13 Tr. 148, Ls.14-18). 
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ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court err when it failed to instruct the jury on the defense of misfortune 
or accident? 
II. Was there sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Hopkins 




The Trial Court Erred When It Failed To Instruct The Jury On The Defense Of Misfortune Or 
Accident. 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Hopkins asserts that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the defense 
of misfortune or accident thereby depriving her of her constitutional rights to due process, in 
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 
I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution and therefore the conviction must be vacated. 
B. Standard of Review 
The propriety of jury instructions is a question of law over which Idaho appellate courts 
exercise free review. State v. Tadlock, 136 Idaho 413,414, 34 P.3d 1096, 1097 (Ct. App. 2001). 
When reviewing jury instructions, the court must first ask whether the instructions as a whole, 
and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect the applicable law. Id. To be reversible error, 
instructions must have misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Young, 138 
Idaho 370 (2002). 
C. The Trial Court Erred When It Failed To Instruct The Jury On The Defense Of 
Misfortune Or Accident. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that, "[n]o person shall be 
... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV. The Fifth Amendment's right to due process of law-includes the requirement that the State 
bear the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-78 (1993). Similarly, the Idaho Constitution guarantees 
that, "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law." 
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ID. CONST. art. I, § 13. The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States Supreme 
Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States Constitution to art. 
1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dep 't of Health and Welfare ex rel. 
Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227, 970 P.2d 14 (1998). Thus, the due process requirement that the 
State bear the burden of proving all elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt is 
also a requirement of Article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. 
The right to present a defense is a fundamental right of due process of law which includes 
the defendant's right to present its version of the facts. State v. Meister, 148 Idaho 236,220,239 
P.3d 1055, 1058 (2009). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[a]s a rule, the trial court is 
required to give pertinent instructions by which the jury may be correctly informed with respect 
to the nature and elements of the crime charged and any essential legal principles available to the 
evidence admitted." State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 20, 981 P.2d 738, 745 (1999) (citations 
omitted). 
Idaho has codified the defense of misfortune or accident but, until recently, Idaho 
appellate courts have not been presented with the opportunity to interpret the statute. See State v. 
Macias, 142 Idaho 509, 129 P.3d 1258 (Ct.App.2005) (determining misfortune or accident 
defense jury instruction proper but not required in a battery prosecution where the jury was 
already instructed on the requisite state of mind element). Idaho Code Section 18-201 states that 
"[ a ]11 persons are capable of committing crimes except ... [p ]ersons who committed the act or 
made the omission charged, through misfortune or by accident, when it appears thaHhere was 
not evil design, intention or culpable negligence." The Idaho appellate courts have looked to 
other courts for guidance in interpreting and applying the misfortune or accident defense. The 
California Court of Appeals has provided the following analysis in regard to this defense: 
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Black's Law Dictionary has defined misfortune as "[a)n adverse event, calamity, 
or evil fortune, arising by accident ( or without the will or concurrence of him who 
suffers from it), and not to be foreseen or guarded against by care or prudence." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 6TH ED. The eighth edition of Black's Law 
Dictionary has omitted the term "misfortune" altogether. Further, a search of case 
law reveals that the defense is rarely referred to as one of misfortune and may 
now simply be the defense of accident. An "accident," as defined by Black's Law 
Dictionary, is either " [ a ]n unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence; 
something that does not occur in the usual course of events or that could not be 
reasonably anticipated," or "[a]n unforeseen and injurious occurrence not 
attributable to mistake, negligence, neglect, or misconduct." 
Black's Law Dictionary 8th Edition. 
When a defense is one that negates proof of an element of the charged offense, the 
defendant need only raise a reasonable doubt of the existence of that fact. This is so because the 
defense goes directly to guilt or innocence. The trial court is required to instruct the jury on 
which party has the burden of proof and on the nature of that burden. The accident defense is a 
claim that the defendant acted without forming the mental state necessary to commit the crime. 
People v. Gonzales, 74 Cal.App.4th 382, 390, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 111 (Cal.App.1999) (citations 
omitted). 
Where a special defense of accident or misfortune is provided the burden of production 
for the defense is commonly on the defendant. The burden of persuasion is nearly always on the 
state, beyond a reasonable doubt. 
PAUL H. ROBINSON, ET. AL., CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES, 1 CRIM. L. 
DEF .. § 63 (2005-06). The defendant may present evidence to create a reasonable 
doubt in the minds of jurors as to whether the defendant acted with criminal 
intent. WhetheI"-a-defendant may present- evidence of misfortune-and_whether the 
defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on this defense depends on whether the 
defendant proffers evidence of an accident that would relieve him of criminal 
liability under the defined offense. In our case, the evidence proffered by Dolsby 
must therefore support a theory of accident or misfortune that would relieve him 
from liability for possession of a firearm for lack of the requisite mental state. 
State v. Dolsby, 143 Idaho 352, 145 P.3d 917 (Ct.App. 2005) 
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The mental state that is required for the commission of a particular offense is determined 
by the language of the statute defining that offense. State v. Broadhead, l 3 9 Idaho 663, 666, 84 
P.3d 599, 602 (Ct.App.2004). Whether criminal intent is a necessary element of a statutory 
offense is a matter of construction, to be determined from the language of the statute in view of 
its manifest purpose and design. State v. Prather, 135 Idaho 770, 774, 25 P.3d 83, 87 (2001). 
The language of Idaho Code § 18-7001 states in relevant part that "except as otherwise 
provided in subsection (2) of this section, every person who maliciously injures or destroys any 
real or personal property not his own, .. . is guilty of a misdemeanor." [ emphasis added] The 
specific type of intent the state is required to prove is maliciously. Malicious injury to property 
is not a general intent crime it is a specific intent crime and the malicious intent is defined as "the 
desire to annoy or injure another or the intent to do a wrongful act." IC.TI 1302. 
A trial court must inform the jury on "all matters of law necessary for their information." 
LC. § 19-2132(a). A requested instruction must be given if: (1) it properly states the governing 
law; (2) a reasonable view of at least some evidence would support the defendant's legal theory; 
(3) the subject of the requested instruction is not addressed adequately by other jury instructions; 
and (4) the requested instruction does not constitute an impermissible comment as to the 
evidence. Finally, the defendant in a criminal action is entitled to have his legal theory of 
defense submitted to the jury through an instruction if there is a reasonable view of the evidence 
that would support the theory. Tadlock 136 Idaho at 414. 
·-TheCourt,·in-its denial ofthe-retJ_uestforthemisfortuneoraccidentinstructienstated as 
follows: 
"Okay. I will tell you that I am not inclined at this point to give that instruction 
simply because I don't believe evidence up until this point supports that 
instruction. That may change. I haven't heard all of the evidence at this point." 
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(4/3/13 Tr. p.140, Ls.15-20) 
"All right. With regards to that issue, I am going to sustain the State's objection." 
( 4/3/13 Tr., p.153, Ls.1-3). 
The only instruction given with regard to intent m this case was m the element 
instruction; Instruction No. 13 which provides the following: 
" ... the word "maliciously" means the desire to annoy or injure another or the intent to do 
a wrongful act." 
(R., 45). 
In State v. Macias, 142 Idaho 509, 129 P.3d 1258 (Ct.App.2005) the Court looked at the 
jury instructions as a whole, and determined that it was not reversible error for the trial court not 
to give an instruction on misfortune or accident. Id. However, the Court also held that it would 
have been proper to give the instruction requested but determined that the matter had been 
sufficiently covered by other instructions. Id. at 511, 1260. In Macias, the court gave the jury 
three instructions on the required state of mind: (1) the elements instruction which discussed 
wilfully and unlawfully uses force or violence upon the person of another, actually, intentionally 
and unlawfully striking another, or causing bodily harm; (2) wilful instruction which defined a 
wilful act as something done on purpose; and (3) the act of union and intent instruction. Id. 
When taken together the court decided that the jury had properly been instructed that they could 
not find Macias guilty if the acts were committed through misfortune or accident. Id. The Court 
went on to further state that it may have even been "preferable" for the court to give the 
requested instruction, but it was not essential, therefore not reversible error. Id. 
In this there is simply the definition of "malicious." There was no instruction given with 
regards to the required intent and therefore the trial court erred when it failed to give the 
defendant's requested jury instruction. In this case the evidence was that Ms. Hopkins did not 
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intend to put a hole in the wall. In fact she was unaware a hole had even been made until she 
was contacted by law enforcement later the same day. 
At trial, the State offered the testimony of Deputy Jared Meyer, he offered the following 
testimony regarding Ms. Hopkins' intent: 
Q. And Kelsey stated to you that she was sorry for her actions at the courthouse? 
A. She did. 
Q. And that she had misunderstood the judge's sentence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And she also told you at that time that she did not intend to put a hole in the wall? 
Q. So her -- your understanding of her statements was that she did not intend to put a 
hole in the wall. 
A. Yes. 
(4/3/13 Tr. p.135, Ls.16 - p. 137, Ls.4) 
Ms. Hopkins also offered testimony at trial and her statements with regard to her intent 
were as follow: 
Q. And when did you learn of or find out that there had been a hole in the wall? 
A. I did not know that there was a hole in the wall until after the officer had come to talk 
to me about it. 
Q. And that's when you learned that the hole had been put in the wall? 
·A. Yes; 
Q. And do you know why that is? 
A. No. 
Q. So, like when you left, you were going quickly? 
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A. Yes. 
Q. And so can you just explain to me, you got up and you walked, but then what - how 
did you go to out the door, and how did you end up at your car? 
A. I'm trying to think. So I went out - I walked quickly outside the door. I turned the 
doorknob and went like this, but I did not mean to - for it to hit the wall -
Q. Okay. 
A. - the way it did. 
Q. Did you see it right then? Did you see it hit the wall? 
A. No, I kept going. I didn't even see it. I didn't hear it hit the wall. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I just kept going. Like, I was almost like, running, kind of walking, fast pace. 
Q. Because you had been upset? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Okay. And so then when the officer had told you that there had been damage, what 
did you do? 
A. I told him that I was - I apologized for it, and said I would go down there Monday 
and talk to them about what I can do, whether I can write a letter to the judge or the 
- or the maintenance or whatnot. 
Q. So did you intend to put a hole into that wall? 
A. No, I did not. 
(4/3/13 Tr. p.147, Ls.I -p. 148, Ls.21) 
It is of further interest to note that at the sentencing hearing in this case the Court made 
- - - ---------- ---- -----------~~- --~-·--~·-----·- ~~~ 
the following statement on the record: 
Thank you. Well, Miss Hopkins, what I will tell you is that I don't believe that 
you purposely put a hole in the wall of the courthouse. You purposely hit the 
door and perhaps didn't realize how hard you hit it, but after hearing the evidence 
at the trial I don't believe that that was what you intended to come out of it. 
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(6/10/13 Sh. p.195, Ls.6-13) 
It is clear from the evidence offered at trial and from the statements of the Court that Ms. 
Hopkins lacked the specific intent of maliciously and the requested instruction should have been 
given to the jury because it properly stated the governing law, a reasonable view of the evidence 
would support the defendant's legal theory and more to the point the requested instruction was 
not addressed adequately by other jury instructions. It is undisputed that Ms. Hopkins opened 
the door forcefully and that she intended to open the door forcefully. If malicious injury to 
property was a general intent crime, that would be enough to convict her. However, the evidence 
is clear that there was no intent to commit the wrongful act, which was to cause the damage. 
Opening the door in a forceful manner isn't vvrongful, it's not a criminal act. The criminal act is 
the damage to the wall and there was no intent by Ms. Hopkins to cause that damage. 
ARGUMENT 
II. 
There Was Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Ms. Hopkins Had 
The Requisite Intent To Injure Or Destroy The Property Of Another. 
A. Introduction 
Ms. Hopkins asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of malicious 
injury to property. Specifically, that she lacked the requisite intent to maliciously injure or 
destroy the property of another. ( emphasis added) 
B. Standard of Review 
On appeal, it is clear the Court is precluded from substituting its judgment for that of the 
jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight of the testimony and the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence. State v. Campbell, 104 Idaho 705, 718-19, 662 P.2d 
1149, 1162-63 (Ct.App.1983). The Court must review the evidence, and permissible inferences 
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that can be drawn reasonably from the evidence, in the light most favorable to the respondent. 
State v. Slawson, 124 Idaho 753, 757, 864 P.2d 199, 203 (Ct.App.1993). Where there was 
substantial evidence upon which any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, we will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered 
upon a jury verdict. Id. 
C. There Was Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Ms. 
Hopkins Had The Requisite Intent To Maliciously Injure Or Destroy The Property Of 
Another. 
In this case, there was insufficient evidence to prove that Ms. Hopkins had the intent to 
maliciously injure or damage the property of another. Appellate review of the sufficiency of the 
evidence is limited in scope. A judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be 
overturned on appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact 
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements of a 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592, 594, 944 P.2d 727, 729 (Ct. 
App. 1997). A reasonable trier of fact could not have found that the prosecution in this case 
sustained its burden of proving that Ms. Hopkins maliciously injured or destroyed the property of 
another. 
An accused's right to demand proof of the State's case beyond a reasonable doubt is of 
"surpassing importance." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000). The right to 
demand proof beyond all reasonable doubt is a bedrock constitutional principle. See In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)('-'Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt 
standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it is as a requirement of 
due process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law 
should be enforced and justice administered."' (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 
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(1968)). "Simply stated, the fact that defendant is 'probably' guilty does not equate with guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Ehlert, 811 N.E.2d 620, 631 (Ill. 2004). 
In State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592,944 P.2d 727 (Ct. App. 1997), it was stated that: 
[a]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A 
judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on 
appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact 
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential 
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt ... [w]e will not substitute our 
view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be 
given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence ... [m]oreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the prosecution. 
Id at 594-595, 944 P.2d at 729-730 (citations omitted). 
In State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134, 937 P.2d 960 (Ct. App. 1997), it was noted that, 
"[ e ]vidence is regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it 
in determining whether a disputed point of fact has been proved." Id. at 135, 937 P.2d at 961. 
"The challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is not based on a technical or subtle defect. The 
defense simply says that there was not enough admissible evidence to convict the defendant." 
State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 877, 908 P.2d 566, 570 (Ct. App. 1995). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that the plain language of LC. § 18-7001 does not 
imply a legislative intent to create criminal liability under this section where the injury to the 
property was an unintended consequence of conduct that may have violated some other statute. 
The Court has concluded that by its plain language, LC. § 18-7001 creates culpability for 
· malicious injury to property only where the ·defendant's conduct causing the injury is 
accompanied by an intent to injure the property of another. State v. Nastoff, 124 Idaho 667, 670, 
862 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Ct.App. 1993). Therefore the State is required to prove that Ms. Hopkins 
harbored the intent to knowingly injure the real or personal property that she did not own. The 
13 
evidence in this case not only fails to support an inference of malicious intent, but it gives rise to 
a contrary inference of accident or misfortune. The Court was even held the belief that there was 
no intent to put a hole in the wall of the courthouse. There was no substantial evidence upon 
which the jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Hopkins intentionally put a 
hole in the wall of the courthouse. The State failed to prove the element of malice as required for 
conviction under LC.§ 18-7001. 
The factual argument's which support this issue has been set forth above in Argument I 
and need not be repeated. Ms. Hopkins hereby incorporates them by reference. The State failed 
to meet its burden because no evidence was presented at trial that Ms. Hopkins had the requisite 
intent to maliciously injure or destroy the property of another. It was clear on all accounts that 
Ms. Hopkins intended to forcefully open the door because she was angry and upset at the 
sentence that her brother had received. She was upset that he had been remanded and taken into 
custody. That intent would be enough if this was a general intent crime. However, malicious 
injury to property requires the mental state of committing the illegal act. The illegal act in this 
case is not the opening of the door; it is the causing of the damage to the wall which occurred 
because the door was opened forcefully. There is not substantial and competent evidence to 
support a verdict of guilty with regard to the specific intent required. 
14 
CONCLUSION 
Because the proffered evidence yielded facts establishing the defense of misfortune or 
accident, it was error for the trial court to refuse giving the requested jury instruction, further 
because there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, Ms. Hopkins respectfully 
requests that this court vacate her judgment of conviction and enter a judgment of acquittal. 
DATED this 16th day of June 2014. 
HEIDI TOLMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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